

JOHN OF SALISBURY'S *POLICRATICUS* – MIRROR OF THE PRINCE BETWEEN *OTIUM* AND *NEGOTIUM*

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Short Biographical Note

Philosopher and bureaucrat, John of Salisbury was one of the most involved personalities in the political life of XIIth century England. “John was born at Old Sarum (the former site of Salisbury) in England between 1115 and 1120” (Nederman, 2007/1990: *xvi*). Starting from 1136 he studied at Chartres and Paris, under the guidance of masters such as Peter Abelard, Robert of Melum, William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, Adam de Petit Pont, Gilbert of Poitiers, Robert Pullan (*ibidem*). In 1148, as a result of Bernard of Clairvaux’s recommendation letter from 1147, he became secretary of the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Theobald (Grellard, 2015:7). Following Theobald’s death in 1161, John became the secretary of the new Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, whom he supported in the conflict with King Henry II, and whom he followed in exile in France. When Becket was recalled from exile by Henry II, John preceded him in England to prepare the Archbishop’s return. He was at Becket’s side up until the latter’s assassination, which he personally witnessed and described, first in his personal correspondence, and later in his *Life of Thomas Becket*. During the years succeeding Becket’s death, John took up at first the role of Archdeacon at Exeter cathedral, and in 1176, he was appointed as Bishop of Chartres by King Louis VII (Grellard, 2015: 13–14). He held this position until the end of his life, in 1180. Throughout his career as a secretary to the Archbishops of Canterbury, John of Salisbury was in contact with the most preeminent personalities of his time. He acted as an intermediary in the negotiations between King Henry II and King Louis VII of France, and also in the relations between Henry II and the papacy.

John of Salisbury’s Philosophical Treatises

John of Salisbury’s philosophical treatises represent the embodiment of both his studies, and, at the same time, of his practical political experience. His two

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major philosophical treatises, the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*, were published together in 1159. They were dedicated to Thomas Becket, who at that time held the position of chancellor of England. Moreover, the author addresses Becket directly throughout the entire *Policraticus*, sometimes evoking events from their recent history, at other times tackling subjects of past conversations.

The *Metalogicon* appears as a defence of the liberal arts, particularly of the *trivium* taught in the medieval universities of John's time. The treatise is made up of four books, the first focused on medieval Grammar and the other three books focused on medieval Logic. Grammar is, in John's view, a meta-science, it sits at the basis of all the other liberal arts and makes it possible for the individual to gain access to these other arts. In addition, grammar makes the relations between humans possible, as well as the relation between man and God.

On the basis laid down by the *Metalogicon*, the *Policraticus* acts as an organic evolution. It brings the role of language to the next level, positioning it as the backbone of John of Salisbury's political philosophy. The writing of the *Policraticus* started sometime between 1154–1156 with the composition of the *Entheticus Maior*, a philosophical poem in which John of Salisbury criticizes the vices of the courtiers and eulogies the virtues of philosophers, exposing an ideal image of the intellectual citizen (Nederman, 2007/1990: XVIII). John then expands the topics of the *Entheticus Maior* into prose, thus creating the *Policraticus*, probably starting with "1156–1157, during his period of self-proclaimed 'disgrace' when he was exiled from Canterbury due to Henry II's anger" (*ibidem*). The *Policraticus* is made up of eight books and it can be split into two parts, as the subtitle of the treatise suggests: *The Frivolities of the Courtiers and the Footprints of the Philosophers*. The first part is made up of the first three books and represents a criticism of the frivolities of the courtiers. The second part is made up of the last five books and depicts the ideal form of the state.

The *Policraticus* as Mirror of the Prince

The *Policraticus* can be considered a mirror of prince both due to its dedicatee and to its content. In what the dedicatee is concerned, there is an explicit target reader and an implicit one. Thomas Becket was the chancellor of England at the time when the *Policraticus* was being written and at the time it was published. This position made Becket the second man in the state and the right hand of the king. In addition, Becket was a very close friend of Henry II's. By dedicating his work to Becket, John was actually ensuring that the treatise would get in the hands of the young king, to whom it could serve as a political guide. In what the content is concerned, the treatise comprises, on the one hand, an illustration of the type of behaviour which a prince should not manifest, and, on the other hand, the guidelines according to which a prince should run the state. The *Policraticus* exposes appropriate and inappropriate manifestations of both active, political, life

(*negotium*) and of spare time (*otium*). The classification into *otium* and *negotium* is taken by John from Cicero, whose follower he claims to be right from the start, in the first book's prologue, where he states that he is "a devotee of Academic dispute, which measures by reason that which presents itself as more probable. I am not ashamed of the declarations of the Academics, so that I do not recede from their footprints in those matters about which wise men have no doubts. Although this school may seem to introduce obscurity into all matters, none is more faithful to the examination of truth and, on the authority of Cicero who in old age took refuge in it, none is on better terms with progress" (Salisbury, 2007/1990: 7). John takes Cicero's classification of daily life activities and adds to it an ethical level. The addition of a moral theory in connection to the ancient *otium/negotium* classification is due to the historical context, of John's profoundly Christian XIIth century, in which man's life needed to be oriented towards gaining eternal salvation.

Negotium

In what *negotium* is concerned, the structure of John's ideal state needs to be addressed firstly. John of Salisbury makes use of an organic metaphor, as the state takes the shape of the human body in which "The position of the head in the republic is occupied, however, by a prince subject only to God and to those who act in His place on earth, inasmuch as in the human body the head is stimulated and ruled by the soul. The place of the heart is occupied by the senate, from which proceeds the beginning of good and bad works. The duties of the ears, eyes and mouth are claimed by the judges and governors of provinces. The hands coincide with officials and soldiers. Those who always assist the prince are comparable to the flanks. Treasurers and record keepers (I speak not of those who supervise prisoners, but of the counts of the Exchequer) resemble the shape of the stomach and intestines; these, if they accumulate with great avidity and tenaciously preserve their accumulation, engender innumerable and incurable diseases so that their infection threatens to ruin the whole body. Furthermore, the feet coincide with peasants perpetually bound to the soil, for whom it is all the more necessary that the head take precautions, in that they more often meet with accidents while they walk on the earth in bodily subservience; and those who erect, sustain and move forward the mass of the whole body are justly owed shelter and support. Remove from the fittest body the aid of the feet; it does not proceed under its own power, but either crawls shamefully, uselessly and offensively on its hands or else is moved with the assistance of brute animals" (Salisbury, 2007/1990: 67). The soul of this body is represented by the church.

Above both body and soul reigns the law. While the church is regulated by divine law, found in the Scriptures, the body politic proper is governed by the lay law. Lay law, in John of Salisbury's view, necessarily originates in divine law,

whose spirit it needs to respect. Even though the prince is the legislative instance in the state in Salisbury's perspective, he must maintain the lay law in the spirit of the divine law. If the prince tries to modify the law according to his pleasure, disregarding the divine law, he becomes a tyrant. The same happens if the prince acts against the law. According to John of Salisbury, tyrants are not just princes who act contrary to the law, but they can be found at all levels of society. One can encounter domestic tyrants, at the level of the individual household, even lay tyrants, inside the church. Tyrants represent divine punishment for those subordinated to them, they are to be tolerated for some time, but once their reign becomes unbearable, they should be removed from power, even if this involves their slaying. It is admissible to slay the tyrant because he cannot be redeemed. By acting in defiance of the law, the tyrant lapses to an inferior ontological level. In the neo-platonic paradigm, in which John operates, an ontologically inferior creature cannot accede to an ontologically superior level, therefore the tyrant cannot change for the better.

Otium

Regarding *otium*, John of Salisbury extensively discusses improper forms of spending one's spare time, in the first two books of the *Policraticus*. He addresses hunting, gambling, theatre, lay music, and divinatory practices, displaying their faults through numerous *exempla*.

Firstly, in regards to hunting, John considers that "if properly pursued, is viewed as an occupation or business; if not, as a waste of time or as vicious; and they who practice it in the face of duty are punished by law" (Salisbury, 1972: 12). He gives mythological examples of hunting as *negotium*, hypostasis in which it is an honourable practice, as it brings benefits to the commonwealth "Can you name any man of distinction who has been an enthusiast in the sport of hunting? The heroic son of Alceus, although he pierced the bronze-hoofed hind and brought sweet calm to Erymanthus' grove, had in view not his own pleasure but the general good. Meleager slew the boar that ravaged Caledonia, not to give pleasure to himself but to free his country from the scourge. The founder of the Roman race laid low the seven huge stags not to sate his vanity and pleasure but to keep himself and his followers alive. It is from their purpose and result that deeds are judged. An act is seemly if the cause that preceded it is honorable. Who ever formed an army of hunters and dogs except for the purpose of battling beasts with courage not his own?" (Salisbury, 1972: 15). Hunting, if done for mere pleasure is not honourable for man, as it does not stimulate rationality, the trait which differentiates humans from animals and brings them closer to the nature of their Creator "That it may be evident that I am attacking with my pen hunting and other diversions of courtiers judiciously rather than in a spirit of hatred, I would gladly agree to count hunting among things called *indifferentia* (neither good nor evil) were it not for the fact that

the inordinate pleasure that it causes impairs the human mind and undermines reason itself" (Salisbury, 1972: 22). By going against rationality, hunting entices other vices, as it breaks the equilibrium of having *otium* after *negotium*, not *otium* after *otium* "Repose is sought after labor. Amusements are more delightful if hardships precede. Organisms utterly exhausted recruit themselves with greater avidity. To this day hunters smack of the Centaurs' training. Rarely is one found to be modest or dignified, rarely self-controlled, and in my opinion never temperate. They were indeed [27] imbued with these characteristics in the home of Chiron. Hence the warning to shun the Centaurs' feasts, from which no one goes unscathed" (Salisbury, 1972: 18). The bad influence hunting exercises upon one's character goes so far as to favour the contouring of tyrannical traits "Therefore tyranny, initiated by a huntsman to insult the Creator, finds its sole source in one who, amid the slaughter of beasts, wallowing in blood, learned to feel contempt for the Lord" (*ibidem*). Moreover, hunting as *otium*, instead of bringing benefits to the commonwealth, brings damage to farmers and goes against landlords' right of property "Farmers are kept from their fields that wild beasts may have liberty to roam. That feeding ground for them may be increased farmers are deprived of their fields of grain, tenants of their allotments, the herds and flocks of their pasturage. Hives are excluded from flowery places and the very bees are scarcely allowed to roam at liberty. You are correct in saying that although the gadfly and other pests which do not annoy wild beasts but the pets of the mighty, cannot be driven off by them with all their might; even the gnat employs its weapons to avenge man and properly turns its sharp sting against wild beasts. In this way, if you should be here you will be compelled to buy up or lose your own fields, year by year. Choose whichever you prefer of the two fundamental rights of citizenship, you are threatened with the loss of life or property, one or the other" (Salisbury, 1972:21).

Secondly, gambling is criticized by John for similar reasons, as the gambler leaves his fate in the hands of chance, instead of subduing it to reason "Who would not be ashamed to owe the favor of his own destiny not to his own character but to the cast of dice? Who would not resent allowing the foresight of the dice-box to take precedence of his own judgment?" (Salisbury, 1972: 25). In addition, just like in the case of hunting, gambling violates private property "Gambling is the mother of liars and perjury for she is prodigal as the result of her lust for others' possessions and, having no respect for private property, as soon as she has squandered her own, gradually has recourse to theft and rapine" (Salisbury, 1972: 25–26). To the objection that gambling can also bring profit, John brings forward the argument that the financial gain is not proportional to the amount of energy invested, resulting in an irrational waste of resources "But to me it seems the more ruinous in that nothing is less profitable than to expend much labor on that by which one profits [37] little. For the importunity of the suppliant is inexpedient when by it the inexpedient is acquired, and zeal in requesting is folly where attainment produces no beneficial result" (Salisbury, 1972: 26).

Thirdly, the topic of music is tackled. Right from the start, John emphasizes the noble nature of music, as one of the liberal arts “Music is indeed one of the liberal arts and it has an honorable origin whether it claims Pythagoras, Moses, or Tubal, the father of those who play upon the harp, as the author of its being” (Salisbury, 1972: 28). Music is immaterial in nature, being of a similar nature to the human soul “Sense harmonizing with reason regulates and renders efficient the life of each nature and substance by decree of divine disposition. The soul therefore distributes nourishment to all things and thrives in each of them in its own essence except insofar as it is not submerged by the weight of corporeal mass or as the confusion of external commotion does not disturb the spirit’s tranquillity. When this assails it nothing can be more wholesome than for the soul to be recalled, so to speak, from the violence of tumult to itself by nature’s tones, which are its own. What, in fine, can be more comparable to the spirit of man than tone?” (Salisbury, 1972: 28–29). Both the benefits and the dangers of music lie precisely in its similar nature to the human soul. Music can put the soul in harmony with its Creator, by triggering an intellectual involvement, as happens in the case of religious music “But how may these reasonable limits be realized? “My lips shall greatly rejoice” says the psalmist “when I shall sing to thee.” If therefore out of the abundance of the heart your mouth sing the praise of the Lord, if you make music with the spirit and the mind, if in fine you sing in wisdom, even without the use of words, you possess the secret of true moderation and, not so much with the rejoicing of the voice as with that of the mind, you soothe the ears of the Most High and wisely avert his wrath” (Salisbury, 1972: 29). However, it can also lead the soul into temptation, due to irrational exaggeration of the rhythm, as happens in the case of lay music “The Phrygian mode and other corrupting types serve no purpose in wholesome training; rather develop the evil inherent in its devotee. Legitimate musical instruction grieves and laments its disfigurement by a vice that is not inherent in it and by the fact that a harlot’s appearance is given to that which was wont to inspire virile minds with manly ideals. The singing of love songs in the presence of men of eminence was once considered in bad taste, but now it is considered praiseworthy for men of greater eminence to sing and play love songs which they themselves with greater propriety call *stulticia*, follies. The very service of the Church is defiled, in that before the face of the Lord, in the very sanctuary of sanctuaries, they, showing off [42] as it were, strive with the effeminate dalliance of wanton tones and musical phrasing to astound, enervate, and dwarf simple souls. When one hears the excessively caressing melodies of voices beginning, chiming in, carrying the air, dying away, rising again, and dominating, he may well believe that it is the song of the sirens and not the sound of men’s voices; he may marvel at the flexibility of tone which neither the nightingale, the parrot, or any bird with greater range than these can rival. Such indeed is the ease of running up or down the scale, such the dividing or doubling of the notes and the repetitions of the phrases and their incorporation one by one; the

high and very high notes are so tempered with low or somewhat low that one's very ears lose the ability to discriminate, and the mind, soothed by such sweetness, no longer has power to pass judgment upon what it hears. When this type of music is carried to the extreme it is more likely to stir lascivious sensations in the loins than devotion in the heart. But if it be kept within reasonable limits it frees the mind from care, banishes worry about things temporal, and by imparting joy and peace and by inspiring a deep love for God draws souls to association with the angels" (Salisbury, 1972: 28–29).

Fourthly, on the problem of theatre, John states that watching plays would be virtuous, if these plays would instruct and not just entertain "Indeed there were once actors who by the magic of gesture, of language, and of voice reproduced vividly for the audience both fact and fiction. These were the contemporaries of Plautus and Menander and such as were intimate with our favorite Terence" (Salisbury, 1972: 33). Without an educational purpose, theatre lacks the rational element. Furthermore, the activity of being an actor lacks rationality in itself, due to the fact that actors do not use their own reason when playing a part, but only mimic what they are instructed to do, having no free will. John considers the vicious of the world as being actors in the comedy of life, who only mimic a part, without using their reason "almost the entire world, according to the opinion of our friend Petronius, is seen to play the part of actor to perfection, the actors gazing as it were upon their own comedy and what is worse, so absorbed in it that they are unable to return to reality when occasion demands" (Salisbury, 1972: 151). Another argument which John brings forward is that theatre encourages *otium* after *otium*. This unbalanced way of life leads man into vice, especially if the plays are obscene "It is pleasant and not in the least unbecoming for a man of honor to indulge occasionally in reasonable mirth, but it is disgraceful to lower personal dignity by excessive indulgence in it. From such spectacles also (especially if obscene) the eye of the honorable man should be turned lest the incontinence of his mind, as well, proclaim his lewdness" (Salisbury, 1972: 35).

Lastly, John focuses on the topic of divination as a pass time. He objects to divinatory practices because they are irrational "Of what significance is it in the sequence of events whether one sneeze once or several times, or that he [66] yawn, or in fine give vent to any sound? Such manifestations, for reasons with which physicians are acquainted, do indeed pertain to some extent to him who is subject to them. We grant this provided they be not supposed to impede or to promote the activities of others any more than do silly charms or certain amulets worn by the superstitious, practices condemned by the whole medical profession despite the fact that some people give them the high sounding name of supernatural phenomena. By the supernatural, the laws of which are most mysterious, they mean those manifestations of nature which cannot be compassed by human sense unaided. In fact there is no act or object whose origin is not due to some specific cause and purpose. As one has put it, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." This is a statement generally accepted because nothing escapes the hand of the

master builder of nature” (Salisbury, 1972: 50–51). He argues that if divinatory practices were a real art, as they claim, they would have clear methods of teaching and would yield accurate results at all times, as in the case of legitimate sciences “Now were this possible with regard to a profession based upon human wisdom, I would be inclined to believe that one of his predecessors had won distinction before him, or I would readily think that a holy man filled with the spirit of piety had bequeathed the knowledge of acquiring distinction, if not to man in general, which would have been but right, at least to his own sons and brothers” (Salisbury, 1972: 204). Since divination lacks rationality, it cannot be of divine origin in John’s view. As a result, divination is associated with a deceiving demonic influence “Long ago the Christian Fathers condemned those who practiced the more demoralizing forms of legerdemain, the art of magic, and astrology because they realized that all these arts, or rather artifices, derive from unholy commerce between men and demons. Very frequently their practitioners cite truth with the sole intent to deceive, and of these Our Lord warns the souls of his faithful; If they shall tell you and so it come to pass, believe them not” (Salisbury, 1972: 35–36).

The only acceptable form of *otium* for John remains the study of philosophy and the liberal arts. This study stimulates rationality and keeps man’s connection with his Creator and with the rest of society alive and functional “For arts as well had inevitably perished, law disappeared, fidelity and religion itself crumbled, and even the proper use of language been lost, had not divine commiseration, to offset human frailty, provided mortals with the knowledge of letters” (Salisbury, 1972: 8).

The Rational Criterion

Considering John of Salisbury’s classification of *otium* and *negotium* into appropriate and inappropriate forms, there arises the question of whether a general criterion can be extracted from his individual argumentations against particular forms of inappropriate *otium* and *negotium*. What emerges, at a first glance, is John’s preoccupation for rationality. This comes from the fact that, for him, God is “indisputably a God of knowledge” (Salisbury, 1972: 120). Reason is therefore the element that man shares with his creator, it is the superior and defining characteristic of humanity in comparison with the rest of creation. In order for man to achieve his full potential and to gain salvation, he needs to cultivate rationality. For *negotium*, the rational principle ratifying appropriate behaviour is the law. The law itself is an expression of divine rationality, as Walter Ullmann argues in the case of *Justinian’s Code* “Evidently, the Code was the place which demonstrated in almost classic form the working of the descending theme of government and law. The emperor was the law-giver and the subjects were the recipients of his laws. Law was conceived as a concession by the emperor (principle of concession): it was the means by which the *Pantokrator* ruled mankind through the *kosmokrator*” (Ullmann, 2008/1975: 62). As a result, rationality appears as a universal characteristic which man needs to pursue and feed both in his active life and in his pass time.

Mirror of the Prince?

In spite of its apparent image as mirror of the prince, the *Policraticus* raises some questions to whether it was actually meant to instruct Henry II. Such suspicion arises when correlating the historical context in which the *Policraticus* was written with certain textual hints.

From the point of view of the historical context, the *Policraticus* was written between 1154 and 1159, which implies that most of its composition was done while John was in disgrace. When taking a closer look at the *Entheticus Minor*, which precedes the *Policraticus*, acting as its introduction, one can trace the book's journey inside the *prosopopeea* as starting in Britain at the prince's court, crossing the Channel to Poitiers and then returning to Kent. This most probably would have been John's own itinerary during his period of disgrace.

Furthermore, the vices which John criticizes in the first three books of the *Policraticus* were some of the habitual forms of pass time at Henry II's court "Henry's passion was for hunting, for which the court became famous" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_II_of_England#cite_ref-174, January 28th 2018). John even recounts some of these instances when addressing Becket directly in the *Policraticus* "When the King's army was preparing to[144] advance against the Snowdon Welsh, in what respect did the soothsayers, when consulted, give you warning to advance? To be sure the mystery of truth ought not to be required of him who, because of a chamberlain's compliance, should be regarded as the deviser of lies rather than the interpreter of hidden truth. In fact when anyone is to be branded as a liar, the common expression used is "a greater liar than a chamberlain." Again, what has the palmist to offer when summoned and consulted? For at that crisis each, whoever he was, who practiced either art was consulted. As a matter of fact after the lapse of a few days, without warning, you lost your brother-in-law, who was your star, the son of morning as it were. The rest of it, which you know better than I, I purposely pass in silence since they, as a result of their lies, no longer deserve to be trusted" (Salisbury, 1972: 112–113).

In addition, it is generally agreed by historians that one of the most significant political measures of Henry II's reign was the reformation of the legal system "Henry greatly expanded the role of royal justice in England, producing a more coherent legal system, summarised at the end of his reign in the treatise of Glanvill, an early legal handbook. Despite these reforms it is uncertain if Henry had a grand vision for his new legal system and the reforms seem to have proceeded in a steady, pragmatic fashion." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_II_of_England#Law, January 28th 2018). Such an extensive legal reformation programme might have appeared in John's eyes to be an abusive change of the law according to the king's personal interests. This would have made a tyrant of Henry II's from John's perspective. Therefore, taking into consideration John's idea that a tyrant cannot be changed for the good, it is hard to think that he wrote the *Policraticus* as a guide for the king, with the hope that the latter will change according to John's ideal.

There arises the question of what the purpose of the *Policraticus* was, if not to instruct Henry II. A potential answer may emerge when looking at the climax of John's career "John's election as bishop of Chartres in 1176 was helped by the backing of William White Hands, archbishop of Sens, and proves the significance of the networks John had been able to create in Capetian circles; William may also have calculated that this promotion could counter the ambitions of Henry II" (Grellard, 2015: 14). It seems that by 1176 John had a consistent relation to the royal family of France. The links to Louis VII might have originated through Bernard of Clairvaux, as the latter had initially mediated the relations between Henry II and Louis VII "Henry's father advised him to come to terms with Louis and peace was made between them in August 1151 after mediation by Bernard of Clairvaux" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_II_of_England#Developments_in_France, January 29th 2018). This exact role of mediator between the two princes was later taken up by John of Salisbury, whom Bernard himself had recommended to Theobald's service back in 1147. In this context, it is possible that the *Policraticus* had actually been part of a greater strategy of the French crown, meant to help them gain the sympathy of the Norman barons, so as to oppose Henry II "Louis invariably attempted to take the moral high ground in respect to Henry, capitalising on his reputation as a crusader and circulating rumours about his rival's behaviour and character" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_II_of_England#Developments_in_France, January 29th 2018). If such a hypothesis is to be accepted as valid, then the *Policraticus* should be seen as a criticism to the English crown and a mirror for the Louis VII.

Conclusions

All in all, John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* presents itself as a mirror of the princes, whether satirical or not, regardless of the prince it is meant to instruct. At the core of this treatise lies a rational principle which disseminates between right and wrong, between appropriate and inappropriate *otium* and *negotium*.

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POLICRATICUS DE IOAN SALISBURY – OGLINDA PRINCIPELUI ÎN TRE OTIUM ȘI NEGOTIUM

REZUMAT

Policraticus de Ioan Salisbury se prezintă sub forma unei oglinzi literare a principelui, prin dedicație (îi este dedicată lui Thomas Becket, cancelar al Angliei și mâna dreaptă a principelui) și a structurii sale (o parte, critică de moravuri, o altă parte, prezentare a structurii ideale a statului). Tratatul înlocuiește vechile clasificări ale activităților în *otium* și *negotium* și adaugă o dimensiune etică, datorită căreia aceste categorii capătă atât forme corespunzătoare, cât și necorespunzătoare. Distincția dintre formele corespunzătoare și cele necorespunzătoare de *otium* și *negotium* este determinată de un principiu rațional în viziunea lui Ioan. Cu toate acestea, în context istoric mai larg, și un număr de indicii intratextuale ridică suspiciunea că *Policraticus* ar fi putut funcționa, de fapt, ca o satiră la adresa lui Henric al II-lea, și ar fi avut scopuri educative pentru Ludovic al VII-lea.

Cuvinte-cheie: Ioan Salisbury, oglinda principilor, *otium*, *negotium*